Tuesday, May 12, 2015

Answers for Kemetica

In a previous thread, our new commenter Kemetica posed a few questions:

My point was that those who oppose SSM must be very clear on what it is that they want:
Just to be allowed to dissent (e.g. a clerk doesn't have to file an SSM marriage license) because of conscience?
To be allowed to refuse gays service for arguably expressive activities (e.g. cakes and photos and flowers)?
To be allowed to reject any service to gays in any context (e.g. housing)? 
To eventually be able to ban SSM?
To eventually be able to ban domestic partnerships? 
To eventually be able to reinstitute the closet?

My answers are a bit too long to be conveyed in a comment in that thread, not to mention that the comments are taking off in a different direction from Keith's original post, so I'm answering them in this new post.

But to answer fairly, I'll need to reframe the questions differently. Actually, they fall into two separate questions.

1.  "To eventually be able to ban SSM?" 

The short answer is:  unquestionably yes.

As I discussed here, IMO and under current equal protection law, a State can have a perfectly rational basis for establishing a special status for one-woman-one-man committed relationships (i.e. marriages).  To rehash briefly, biology matters in that men and women are different in ways that complement each other -- and that complementarity not only results in procreation, but indeed has shown through history to be the basis of stable and prosperous societies.  A State can (and should) recognize the importance of these facts, as based in biology, by favoring such arrangements.

Secondly, under our constitutional system, a State may, through its duly elected legislature, choose to define marriage to extend to same sex arrangements.  I don't think they should, but under our system they can. But the electorate and their representatives ought to be permitted to work out this question one way or the other, so that those who are disappointed by the result can at least respect the process. But if the Supreme Court rules that a State cannot define marriage as one-woman-one-man, that process is taken away from the electorate -- rather than settling the question, preventing the question from being settled  See the political effects of Roe v. Wade if you don't believe me.

2.  Why should you not be compelled, under penalty of law, to offer services to those selected by the State?

On the questions about "rejecting service" and the like, your questions are framed incorrectly IMO.  What you are asking is why the State shouldn't compel any business to offer their services to those identified by the State.

Here's where I'll earn some libertarian points, maybe.  IMO, the starting point should be:  no person shall be compelled, under threat of law, to perform services to anyone who he or she do not want to, unless there is a damn good reason.

As I mentioned here, race is a damn good reason.  We fought a Civil War in which hundreds of thousands of our citizens lost their lives over this issue, and we have express constitutional amendments on this issue.  And MLK showed us why racial discrimination is contrary to reason and God's laws.

I would pose that there are few other "damn good reasons" to compel businesses, under penalty of law. Preventing discrimination based on sexual orientation falls short of a damn good reason, IMO.  And as Keith mentioned, the market and social stigma can provide excellent motivations in this regard.  Few businesses will turn away willing customers -- and if some do for illegitimate reasons as judged by the consuming public, competition will take care of the issue.

But in any case, the law should never require one to violate one's religious tenets (facilitating sin) in order to comply with the law.  We must not entertain a regime, as we have now with Obamacare and in the Indiana situation, in which the approach is to enact and enforce such a law, with the possibility that waivers or exemptions may be granted for religious reasons.  No -- a law requiring compliance by violation of religious tenets is an unjust law, and "an unjust law is no law at all" (St. Augustine).

Does this mean that a homeowner renting out a room or half of a duplex via AirBnB can choose not to rent to practicing homosexuals so as not to facilitate sin?  Of course.  Does this mean that a Muslim restaurant can require men and women to sit in separate rooms if required by their flavor of Islam?  Sorry, but it means that too.

There you go.  Have at it. Convince me of my error.

32 comments:

  1. Is not the demand that those who oppose SSM identify where they fall on the ungoodthink spectrum, lest they be suspected of even worse thoughtcrime, a little odd?

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    1. It's more like, "I want you to tell me your real motivations so I'll know whether you're someone I can work with and with whom I can maybe work out compromises, or whether you're concealing your ultimate desire to crush me, in which case I'm going to fight you tooth and nail." I think that would be a good attitude for a social conservative to have towards a proponent of SSM, too. Political disagreement should be open and honest, and each side can decide for itself whether it's worth the effort to work together, or whether it has to be pure combat.

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    2. I thought so. The questions tilted the playing field a good bit, which is why I addressed them this way.

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    3. Well, gays have often been accused by socons of being disingenuous about their real motivations, haven't they? Assuming this is so, would it not have been more honest for them to have been upfront from the git-go? And shouldn't that work both ways? How is that "tilting the field"?

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    4. In two ways. First, there's the presumption of mendacity. "What's your *real* motive?" I don't endorse such long-game psychologizing of any subject by any side -- well, unless you count when the long-game psychology is known and acknowledged, but knowing isn't the same thing as presuming.

      The second way is that the questions themselves beg the question of SSM. They may be legitimate requests for information, but the requests are phrased in terms of progressive triumphalism. "Given that you're wrong on SSM, exactly how wrong are you?"

      It's all the more striking because ten years ago -- even seven years ago, if you were running for the Democratic presidential nomination -- that underlying presumption would have been nonsensical. If it's too much to say they are goodthinkful questions, they are at least expressed in a way that privileges this novel perspective of the questioner at the expense of those who are asked the questions.

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  2. The problems I see with the State allowing religious values to reign unfettered is that, historically, perceptions of sin have most frequently been applied by one religious interpretation of sin and error against another religious interpretation of sin and error. Things were much simpler in the Holy Roman Empire and, if ISIS will have its way, in its envisioned new Caliphate. Unfortunately, under all these systems the odd human being out, measured by whatever human quality doesn't conform to the reigning standard, lives in relative second class dhimmitude. Come what may, that will not be the case with this bad cradle Methodist Monkey.

    The second obvious problem is merely an amplification of the first: being in the reigning, sin-adjudicating majority is, as history has taught us, never a sure thing.

    This is why I am overwhelmingly happy with our constitutional system, which took the initial step of daisycutting the terrain entirely: Boom! No more more Church of England, no more Holy Roman Empire, just a terrifyingly new empty Cartesian grid of liberty where each could pursue his beliefs as he chose, without either the assistance of the State or its domination.

    But tribal attempts by human groups to dominate one another endure in our very nature. Perhaps this tendency toward tribalism, one of the truly defining characteristics of our humanity, is also at the same time our practical Original Sin. The assault by gays on Memories Pizza and Indiana is only the latest iteration, but it will certainly not be the last. So how does one ensure that "my" tribe, whatever "my" tribe happens to be, does not become reduced to the second-class follower of some other? In the history of the West, Catholics of all people should be sensitive to such things, or have the late 20th Century troubles in Northern Ireland already been forgotten? And, in the 200 years since our founding, the number of tribes we have collectively chosen to legitimize has only multiplied.

    And so I think it then becomes an obligation fundamental to the role of our constitutional republic in ensuring the relative liberty of all tribes with respect to one another to establish and uphold the general value of non-discrimination by any tribe against any other, for any reason, throughout the public square of commerce and associated human intercourse. (continues)

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    1. I think the important question here is "who is compelling whom?". IOW, on one hand we have the State, and on the other hand we have private citizens (whether working in concert in fact, or as a natural result of their beliefs).

      Given that we humans each have, as individuals, moral responsibility for our actions, in a free society the State ought not compel violations of our moral tenets under penalty of law. It seems to me that to do so leads only to tyranny.

      But a more practical point: it would seem to me that if the State obtained and exercised the power to compel violation of religious tenets, this would empower the ruling tribe far more than restrain it. I think history bears me out on this -- especially the story of the rise and fall of Soviet Communism. To wit, the Polish pope was seen by the Soviets as a major threat (to which they responded by the KGB hit that nearly took his life), and they were right.

      I'll take my chances with not giving the State this power.

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    2. The problem I see here, Pik, is that you're at one and the same time retaining the full rationale of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 - which has long been extended beyond race (and what "race" is "Hispanic"?) and continues to be extended to one opportunistic protected class after another - while authorizing the State to use it as the yardstick by which to validate the legitimacy of religious beliefs. Thus, all religious beliefs immediately become subject to review as to whether they are "truly religious" or just dodges to the CRA of 1964.

      If you can guarantee that the State will recognize any religious beliefs you wish to claim as religious beliefs as religious beliefs, best of luck. To the extent you can't, you're then SOL.

      I thought a better approach instead would be to roll back and revise the whole of freedom of association/civil rights (what is the civil right to a room with a view?) in light of both cultural changes since 1964 (the way that pre-clearances to the Voting Rights Act were recently revisited) and in light of the standards articulated in RFRA: that the government has no business regulating any freedom of association/civil rights in any sphere, public or private, absent a demonstrable compelling interest, defined an absence of a substantial prevalence of accommodation, from lunch counter space for ethnicities to hospitality or other accommodation for gays, including where it's offered, SSM.

      This has the benefit of extending an additional penumbra or DMZ of free exercise of religion beyond the free exercise clause in the First Amendment and relieving that free exercise clause of shouldering all the weight of justifying any freedom of association/non-accommodation. In a substantially accommodating environment, it becomes a simple defense to prosecution for those self-selected people desiring not to accommodate, for whatever reason. The CRA of 1964 didn't force any large scale change in society, it merely codified one that had already largely occurred.

      My approach won't satisfy any predatory liberal factions, of course, but they obviously aren't satisfied now anyway. What it does do in addition, though, with some broad appeal is to effectively slap the progression of political correctness smartly in the face, that PC becoming increasingly annoying to liberals as much as any others alike.

      It basically leaves the State saying, you folks are just going to have to get along, religiously, racially, and otherwise, and if you demonstrably can't, well step in and remedy it. But no more of this Memories Pizza or Arlene's Flowers crap.

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    3. I don't think I am "authorizing the State to use [the 1964 Act] as the yardstick by which to validate the legitimacy of religious beliefs." But I do need to clarify a bit.

      Where I was trying to go was that the starting point for analysis ought to be the premise that a business ought to be free to sell goods or provide services, or not, to whomever. If there is a damn good reason to limit that freedom (say, in the case of race as posed and accepted), then that's a carve-out from the general rule.

      As both you and I have said, if some businesses turn out to be arbitrary or ill-meaning on who they sell to, people will take their business down the street and the word will get out. Most businesses want to make money, so unreasonableness on this score will largely be self-limiting. If other businesses want to be stupid, they can be stupid. If some businesses are willing to suffer losses for religious reasons, that would be understandable by most and bitched about by others, but at least people would cope.

      The problem today is that this is no longer the starting point. The starting point is instead no discrimination for any reason, religious or otherwise. Rather, one has to cower to the State or rent-seek (see Obamacare) to plead for a waiver or exception. This has become pervasive to the extent that it encroaches, seriously, on even religious liberty.

      In effect, we citizens have tolerated a little loss of liberty here and a little more there, not because we necessarily agree with the rationale, but because it's easier to go along to get along and not be the nail that sticks out more than the others. But now it has gone so far that some of us frogs in the pot are starting to feel the pain -- to wit Memories Pizza and Arlene's Flowers.

      Kemetica asked what we wanted, ideally. So my answer is that I'd rather not hand the cell keys over to the State to begin with. While the "alternative accommodation" idea is well-intended and actually ought to be a determinative factor to any sentient being who doesn't have another agenda, I see it as another element that the free citizen has to prove in order to be free. And because the process is the punishment all too often these days, I fear it will be another tool that will be used to cause submission.

      You and I would of course end up at the same place, even though coming from different directions. But of course we're not the ones we're having the argument with.

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    4. BTW, apologies for the metaphor overload in the previous post. I must have had dreams last night about yardsticks pounding nails and frogs holding jailers' keys.

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    6. Well, that seems to be the only real difference between our positions on this: you're starting from a position of idealism relative to the freedom of association and I'm starting more from what seems to me to be the most that pragmatically would be doable legally. On the one hand, the far more pluralistic and tolerant culture today provides those ample options for accommodation not previously available which I'm utilizing; on the other, the current status of post-CRA protected classes and law suggests to me, at least, some floor principle (say, % of market alternative accommodations available) would be indispensable to actually changing existing law as drastically as I'm suggesting.

      There are a couple other elements associated with the floor I theoretically require that you don't. One, such a metric once established immediately becomes a measure of market opportunity: while some may not like additional opportunities for gay flower vendors to be identified and established, every alternative accommodation that closes the gap in that metric insures that a Baronelle Stutzman remains free to refuse to supply a gay wedding for whatever reason she wants (by analogy, one can think of the service the Jewish moneylender provided a non-usurious Christendom in times past). And this applies universally, keeping everyone's ox - most importantly, mine, in whatever situation - from being gored, both from the standpoint of being accommodated and from the standpoint of not being compelled to accommodate. It might be a stretch, but, aside from the legally mandated metric, one could almost think of it as a self-correcting marketplace of ethical behavior serving a wide variety of often antithetical pluralistic needs with minimal government intrusion.

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  3. But I use these terms "relative" and "general" in the slippery way I do because the values enshrined in our Constitution do not neatly cohere and, when forced into collision under pressure, grate and spark one against another: the liberty that allows any one tribe, through its freedom of association to become a domineering social force over any other then inevitably risks curtailing the liberty and freedom of association of any other tribe it favors less than its own, for whatever reason it might.

    And so my thinking has come around to favoring, rather than an abstract, absolute value of non-discrimination of individuals or tribes one against the other a more practical, relative one continuously calibrated against an ongoing status quo. Fortunately, the original RFRA as well as its children offer an extremely useful term to measure just how heavy the hand of even our constitutional State should press on the lever of enforcing an abstract equality of liberty: "compelling interest".

    Does our constitutional State have a "compelling interest" in seeing that all tribes have an equal liberty of access to bread? Yes. Does our constitutional State have a "compelling interest" in seeing that all tribes have an equal liberty of access to every last possible source of bread? No. And so forth. Shelter? Yes. And no. Medical care? Yes. And no. Wedding photography? Yes. And no.

    And so this is where I might peel away from Pik with my floating status quo standard of "prevalance of alternative accommodation" with respect to the "compelling interest" of the State to abridge an absolute right of freedom of association in order to compel accommodation that would enable the indidivual or tribe otherwise enjoined from association to enjoy its full liberty of participation in the public square.

    So long as some substantial access to accommodation exists - to purchase bread, or shelter, or medical care, or wedding photography - any given individual or tribe could freely and legally not associate with supplying that accommodation. This obviously requires an enduring cohort of willing accommodationists, and, obviously in the case of gays or other violators of religious teaching, even accommodators of sin. But it is those same accommodators of sin in turn who purchase the freedom of the religious from any "compelling interest" by the State to coerce their accommodation. So long as there is a substantial cohort of Kemeticas to provide accommodation, whatever that accommodation might be, there can be no compelling State interest in forcing a Pik to do so. The role of our constitutional State is to compel the values of liberty and free association, but not the values either of homosexuality or of the sinfulness of homosexuality.

    In an era of increasing tribal fragmentation, I really don't see any other practical way. Every competing individual and tribe assumes their values will prevail forever - until one day they don't, and any system that enshrines in principle a right of any particular or parochial tribal value to prevail over all also enshrines in that same principle the right of any competing tribe which might come to dominate in power the right to reduce the first one, now historically become a loser, to a second class dhimmitude under its now prevailing values

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    1. So long as some substantial access to accommodation exists - to purchase bread, or shelter, or medical care, or wedding photography - any given individual or tribe could freely and legally not associate with supplying that accommodation.

      You realize, of course, that this was the exact same logic as "separate but equal", right? And that that didn't actually work, right?

      So long as there is a substantial cohort of Kemeticas to provide accommodation, whatever that accommodation might be, there can be no compelling State interest in forcing a Pik to do so.

      Well, the kicker is the bolded "so long as". As the Reason article points out, even after the Jim Crow laws were ended, there was a lot of social pressure preventing accommodation. If I were a shop owner who thought serving blacks was just fine and dandy, whites might stop patronizing my establishment, I might be ostracized, I might even get my building damaged or attacked. It's that tribalism you speak of. I can easily imagine that in some conservative communities it might be very hard to get a gay-friendly business, for example, running (though I don't suggest it would be as bad as in the days of Jim Crow).

      Finally: I don't think that "in principle a right of any particular or parochial tribal value" should "prevail over all". I've said before: If you're a public business, you don't get to discriminate against anybody for any reason except for safety, hygiene, or functional reasons (you must be so tall to ride this ride; shoes and shirt required for service; you need a health screening for liability reasons; etc.).

      Private organizations can do what they want, and people can accept that, boycott such organizations, or whatever, as they like.

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    2. Me: I've said before: If you're a public business, you don't get to discriminate against anybody for any reason except for safety, hygiene, or functional reasons....

      I should add that while I think refusing to bake a cake for a gay couple's wedding is stupid, I'd add exceptions to what I said above for things such as that. This is a problem, because it would require litigation around gray areas, and it would seem to involve an interpretation of what one's religious values are and what one gets a pass on and what one doesn't. I'd see that as less bad than a "substantial access" doctrine that could under some conditions devolve into a "separate but equal" situation. I guess you see the danger of that as small; I disagree. There's no "good" solution; we just disagree as to the "least bad".

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    3. You realize, of course, that this was the exact same logic as "separate but equal", right? And that that didn't actually work, right?

      No, it's not, as you go on to demonstrate by contradicting yourself in subsequent paragraphs beginning here:

      "So long as there is a substantial cohort of Kemeticas to provide accommodation, whatever that accommodation might be, there can be no compelling State interest in forcing a Pik to do so.

      Well, the kicker is the bolded "so long as"."

      Yes, it is, precisely, which why your first paragraph then ends up becoming a misrepresentation of what I wrote.

      Might some blacks/Catholics/gays/Muslims/Kemeticas become morally but not materially discriminated against in the public square. Yes. That's what public freedom of association does. It discriminates.

      If you want to sacrifice that First Amendment, constitutionally prior right of freedom of association to a legal mandate compelling an abstract, absolute moral recognition of and testimony to the equality of all, even in the face of no meaningful material discriminatory effects whatsoever (what the word "substantial" means), then just say so. If you don't want to sacrifice that First Amendment, constitutionally prior right of freedom of association, then it becomes incumbent upon you to explain how you will preserve it.

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    4. To Keith's first comment here, I'll repeat what I said above that we humans each have, as individuals, ultimate moral accountability for our actions. Our moral responsibilities do not depend on who else in our vicinity is providing the services that we'd rather not, nor should the power of the State to compel our services depend on that.

      And in our ever-more pluralistic and ever-more social-media-responsive capitalist nation these days, I'll take my chances with any given consumer being able to find a source for desired goods and services. My goodness, we used to work around things like this all the time. Remember those Texas road trips back in the day (yes, when one could drink in the car -- even while driving)?

      Hey, pull over to this U-Totem here. I need a cold one.

      Dude, this is a dry county. We'll have to keep going for awhile.

      Damn, I forgot. I guess I can make it to Beeville...


      Couldn't fight the Baptists back then.

      But on a more serious note, the proposed standard of "prevalance of alternative accommodation" is problematic. One man's alternative is another man's unacceptable.

      "But there's not another venue that has this view of the river!!!"

      "But the other b-and-b is so ... so ... gauche!!!"

      and worse yet:

      "But we want to express a statement about our same-sex wedding by having the reception in the Knights of Columbus hall. First Amendment!!!

      Antitrust enforcement is a good example of how the interpretation of "prevalence of alternative accommodation" can change with the winds. The very same transactions that one administration will accept as within the "rule of reason" become subject to much scrutiny in the next administration, and vice versa.

      I don't trust it.

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    5. But on a more serious note, the proposed standard of "prevalance of alternative accommodation" is problematic.

      I agree, but for slightly different reasons. As the Reason article pointed out, even after the repeal of segregation laws, many places didn't see much change because the informal but potent actions of the community enforced segregation nonetheless. A black-friendly business would be harassed and intimidated out of business. Thus, while in theory I could open an integrated restaurant, and in theory the Invisible Hand of the Market would have put paid to segregation; but we know that's not how it actually worked.

      Likewise, it's not hard to imagine that in some conservative communities informal networks of individuals might collude to make it hard for a gay couple to find any alternate accommodation.

      The thing is that once you set the precedent for alternate accommodation, you've got a setup in which future social changes could result in a return of the separate-but-(purportedly) equal doctrine, whether Keith believes that's possible or not.

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    7. Likewise, it's not hard to imagine that in some conservative communities informal networks of individuals might collude to make it hard for a gay couple to find any alternate accommodation.

      In which case a principle of prevalence of alternative accommodation would dictate what, Kemetica? I'll answer for you since somehow it seems to have consistently escaped you: in cases where it proved hard for a gay couple or any other citizen to find any alternate accommodation, no latitude to not accommodate would legally obtain.

      It's not hard to eviscerate something if you begin by changing or throwing out the terms you are presented with, Kemetica. "Likewise, it's not hard to imagine" just about any straw man that might derail an argument.

      And this consistent intellectual dishonesty on your part - it you're merely slow or stupid that's something quite different, but you must explicitly say so - is beginning to make it appear that reasoning together is little more than a pose you've adopted in order to perform litmus tests on those you're interacting with. Are they truly exhibiting Christian virtues? Are they truly worthy of the honor of being engaged in discussion by you? Will they have the "courage of their convictions" to answer the questions you put to them? How high can they jump upon command?

      Maybe someone else wants to waste their time with your dishonest, narcissistic sophistry. I'm out.

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    8. [I]n cases where it proved hard for a gay couple or any other citizen to find any alternate accommodation, no latitude to not accommodate would legally obtain.

      And that's going to be simple, not open to abuse, and won't unleash a flood of litigation. Right.

      Asserting that your plan would work when it hasn't been tried isn't much different from what is or is not hard to imagine. I've given reasons why I think your plan wouldn't work, in fact--it seems to me it would lead to more polarization--but you respond by saying I don't understand you at all. Well, whatever.

      As I said to Pik below, gays have been beaten, killed, imprisoned, subjected to involuntary medical treatment, forbidden from being with their loved ones in hospitals, and on and on, in the past. I think those are quite frankly sins that Christians have inflicted on them, and far worse than anything Christians have yet suffered from gay rights. Given the heinousness of what gays have suffered, you're damned right that a lot of gays, as well as those who are friends or kin to them, find a lot of the whining of socons about how Christians are going back to the catacombs pretty infuriating, and a possible cover for other motives.

      Interesting how you've changed your mind in two days from thinking I was adding to the conversation to name calling. I think my first notion to get out of here was the right one. I'm outa here.

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  4. pikkumatti, I appreciate your answers, although you didn't answer all my questions. In short, if you could remake society in the image you'd prefer, is gays being out OK? What about domestic partnerships? You spoke of service, but what about hiring? I mean, a religious organization has a clear right not to hire a gay person, and the publishers of The Advocate might prefer gay employees; but if you're, say, a mechanical engineer and your performance ratings are off the scale, but your boss finds out you're gay and fires you for that--is that OK?

    Preventing discrimination based on sexual orientation falls short of a damn good reason, IMO.

    That's totally fair. We disagree about "damn good reason", but I see your point.

    [T]he market and social stigma can provide excellent motivations in this regard. Few businesses will turn away willing customers -- and if some do for illegitimate reasons as judged by the consuming public, competition will take care of the issue.

    I have less faith in these mechanisms. This interesting article in Reason makes an interesting argument. Money quote:

    Would "whites only" business practices have crumbled fast, as some libertarians believe, if the federal government had limited itself to dismantling the public foundations of segregation? Or was bigotry too pervasive, too deeply entrenched in minds and morals? The latter seems more likely. Moreover, for generations this private bigotry had been not only enabled but fostered by public policy, from slavery onward. Writing in The New Republic, John McWhorter, an insightful, iconoclastic black commentator, defends Paul's and Stossel's right to express their unorthodox views but also asserts that "the social rejection of racism was driven in large part by the head start, authority, finality, and even the drama of the legal banning of segregation."

    Most likely, over the long haul, overt discrimination against blacks in the private sector would have become socially unacceptable and mostly extinct. But could American society have afforded to wait? To answer "yes" is to underestimate the urgency of the issue, the evil of Jim Crow.


    Now I'm not comparing sexuality to race. The point is that even a libertarian magazine acknowledged that maybe the Invisible Hand of the Market might just not work well enough. I can envision some Bible Belt communities in which gay people would just be SOL regardless.


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    1. See my comments to Keith immediately above this comment of yours. I think that addresses your points on this score.

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  5. But in any case, the law should never require one to violate one's religious tenets (facilitating sin) in order to comply with the law.

    I don't see how it's possible to have a pluralistic society without any such violations ever happening. Taxes pay for all kinds of things religious people may object to. Even pacifists are subject to the draft. Yes, they can be drafted into non-combatant roles; but suppose they oppose even the notion of being in the military at all? They're out of luck.


    Does this mean that a homeowner renting out a room or half of a duplex via AirBnB can choose not to rent to practicing homosexuals so as not to facilitate sin? Of course.


    If it's part of your own house--that's what a B & B is--I agree. Under current law, if you have a building with six or fewer units (I think it's six), you aren't under public accommodation laws. I'm OK with that, too. Larger apartment complex, though? You're under public accommodation laws--too bad about your beliefs.

    Does this mean that a Muslim restaurant can require men and women to sit in separate rooms if required by their flavor of Islam? Sorry, but it means that too.

    If it's in a Muslim neighborhood, serving a mostly Muslim clientele, and if it clearly advertises the rules, then that's OK. If it is in a non-Muslim area, and gives every indication by the way it presents itself that it's an just an ethnic restaurant (not one run by religious principles) and does not give advance notice of the rules (e.g. a sign on the door), then yes, that's a problem.

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    1. I agree that there will be issues, regardless. My point is that we ought not have laws that necessitate such issues on a wide scale, and then have the State dole out waivers and exemptions as they see fit -- not only does that promote rent-seeking behavior by businesses, but it amounts to tyranny. The Obamacare contraceptive mandate is a prime example of that issue.

      And I'd say, as I did above, that a pluralistic society is more of a cure for the problem than its cause. A pluralistic populace will naturally have both consumers and suppliers of the goods and services in the market, as demand dictates.

      On your housing and Muslim restaurant examples, I'm afraid you're legislating your own taste rather than working from principle. You might rethink on that.

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    2. My general principle is that a public business shouldn't discriminate against anyone for anything ever except for hygienic or functional reasons. I give a B & B owner a pass because that's his own house--to me, renting your own living quarters out is different in principle than renting an apartment. The thing about a complex with six or fewer units isn't me--that is the law, as I understand it. I'd say that if you're running an apartment complex for profit then even if you do live in one of the rooms you still ought not discriminate.

      The Muslim restaurant is a harder case and I don't claim to be totally consistent here; but I don't have the time right now to do a full analysis of that case.

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  6. Let's try a different approach to my original questions and rephrase:

    1. Is it better or worse for society as a whole that gays are no longer closeted?

    2. If the answer to 1 is "yes", then would it be better or worse for society as a whole if gay couples had access to domestic partnerships?

    3. Suppose Alex employs Bob. Bob is very well-qualified, exemplary in all ways, and has been one of Alex's employees for ten years. Suppose Alex has recently had a religious conversion to a conservative form of Christianity. Soon after this, he finds out that Bob is gay (he didn't know that previously). Because of his religious convictions, he fires Bob solely because he's gay.

    Now firing a good employee may be a bad business decision, but bosses make such bad decisions all the time. From a freedom of association or liberatarian perspective, one can argue that Alex has the legal right to fire Bob for any reason at all.

    Put all that aside, though. I'm not interested in the business savvy or legality of Alex's firing of Bob. I'm asking this: Is this a moral decision? Why or why not? If so, would it be desirable for all employers in all states (some of which have sexual orientation as a protected category in hiring) to have the same right as Alex does?

    And if you think these questions are unfair or something you don't want to answer, why not? Have the courage of your convictions!

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  7. Well, Kemetica, I don't work for you. But I'll give you some short answers so we can both move on.

    1) Loaded question. You and I will have different meanings in mind for "no longer closeted", so whatever answer I give will be meaningless and fodder for more. And no, I'm not interested in a back and forth on this.

    2) To what end? Seems nobody is happy with this anyway. Proponents say that it is a second-class status, and those who favor it say it is just to let some steam out of the issue.

    3) See my "damn good reason" discussion above.

    On the moral question: we Catholics are taught to love the sinner, but hate the sin; I try to follow that. Boss man has the moral accountability for his decision. Make of that what you will.

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    1. Fair enough. Many conservatives in the past opposed even what would now be considered moderate steps in gay rights: e.g. abolition of anti-sodomy laws, cessation of constant hassling by the police, later on domestic partnerships, etc. They did so on the grounds that such things were chipping away at the traditional intolerance of gays and that the end result would be full acceptance and equality. This they saw as a horrible and unacceptable state of affairs. Of course, the traditional setup enforced intolerance of gays by imprisoning them (Oscar Wilde), forcing them to undergo electroshock (the young Lou Reed), beating them up (a guy in college I knew had a bunch of friends who used to go to the gay district in town, have one member pretend to try to pick up guys, and when one responded--thus signaling that he was gay, they'd all jump him and beat the crap out of him, etc.); but I guess that was seen as just how things were done.

      Gay people--logically enough--didn't likesuch treatment. Hence the gay rights movement. Such incremental steps probably were a slow chipping away at society's negative attitude. Whether acceptance by attrition is a good thing or not depends on one's moral evaluation of homosexuality and its effect on society; but it did work.

      Now there are social conservatives out there--and I'm not saying this applies to anyone here, because I don't know--who would ideally like to return to the status quo ante before, say, the 60's. That is, gays could not openly be known to be gay outside of close friends; the very thought of domestic partnerships, let alone SSM, would be laughable; where sodomy laws would still be on the books; and so on. However, like gays pressing for rights thirty years ago, they'd be loathe, for obvious reasons, to state their ultimate goal. It would have hurt a gay activist in 1970 to say, "Yeah, we want marriage, full acceptance, the whole cigar." It would hurt an anti-SSM activist today to say, "Yeah, I want gays back out of public view, and sodomy laws back on the books."

      Really, in both cases it's clear why neither side was totally open about the ultimate motives involved. The difference is that the status quo against which gays fought involved a lot of nastiness, whereas the status quo against which anti-SSM activists are fighting doesn't involve sending people to jail or shock therapy, or jumping them and beating them up, all because they're socon Christians. Homosexuality may or may not be sinful, but some of would argue that on a balance the present day is better for society as a whole than the pre-Stonewall days.

      Now my point in all of this has been that the reluctance of gay rights activists to trust the drive for exemptions on the part of socons is that they--rightly, in my view--suspect a large proportion of such socons--not all--as wanting not just exemptions, but to turn back the clock; which is obviously not going to fly with them.

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    2. FWIW, I think there should have been more honesty and aboveboard activity on both sides. Gays should have said, "Yeah, we want full equality," from the beginning. Those who want to go back to the pre-60's status quo ought to be fully honest about that, too. I can see why neither side has done so--duh--but I'm saying what they should do.

      As I've said, I support exemptions for the religious in areas where it's a matter of forced speech or expression, and not in most others. We disagree on that, which is fine. I don't think your or Keith's way of dealing with the situation would work in the long term, but once more, we disagree. I do give you kudos, Pik, for maintaining civility and not stooping to insults and name calling.

      I don't really give much of a rodent's posterior on SSM one way or the other--I frankly think the whole thing--which has ample funding on both sides--is a nice way for our plutocratic masters to keep social conservatives and social liberals at each others' throats while they continue to bend us over and laugh all the way to the bank. However, I don't think, if the SCOTUS finds a nationwide right for it, that it will bring about the end of civilization, either.



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    3. Are those the two sides? Gays who want full equality and those who want to go back to the pre-60s status quo?

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    4. Yup, it's the tilted playing field again. Euphemism ("full equality") on one side vs. Bull Conner on the other.

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