Friday, January 15, 2016

The ultimate narcissism of theological Beauty-worship

Perhaps it was Rod Dreher's typically modest comment

In my case, it was perfectly obvious from the beginning why one would want to be Orthodox. But I know myself well enough to admit that I’m a rare type, in that I am unusually moved by beauty. (Recall, it was seeing the Chartres cathedral for the first time at age 17 that brought me back to Christianity.) Beauty alone isn’t enough, but in my particular case, it is so central to my experience of God that I can scarcely do without it. This has been a blessing to me, because it has made me deeply grateful for the role of beauty in holiness, but also a burden, as far too often I am aware of certain disdainful impulses towards low-church worship, a spirit of criticism that is spiritually harmful. (Believe me, it was very much there when I was a Catholic too).

in a post contrasting the beauty in Orthodoxy with the beauty in Catholicism that first got me thinking of this, but it was Dreher's God and Architecture that propelled me to follow through.

Dreher, and, of course, an entire tradition make much of the relationship between Beauty (canonized in capitals) and the Divine, so let's break this down and see how well it holds up under scrutiny.

The common element across all of these pronouncements of beauty is regularity, in space and across time. Forms - including human forms - that are proportional, often symmetrical, as well as entities - the whole concept of architecture itself - that endure in space and across time.

Beauty is conceived in superior contrast to things that don't do this: in contrast to the child with only one pop eye and a seal flipper for a left arm, in contrast to the ramshackle, disposable nest a chimp makes for the night.

But it turns out these elements of Beauty - regularity, proportionality, endurance across time (Platonism) - are in fact at heart human celebrations of itself, of our ability to impose our wills on the vagaries of nature: to build enduring things that function and last, homes that stand, mills that work, etc. We then in turn, perhaps even simultaneously, apply these values to the natural world as well, to its regularities, its proportionalities, and symmetries, none more so than to others of our species. Ever wonder why there are so few truly ugly human beings in the world? Yes, that's right: no dates. Selected against, out, and adios forever.

Consider though, in contrast, an example touched only by the Divine, say, a random mud flat along the Bay of Bengal, at high noon and low tide. Random, irregular, unenduring, soupy, muddy, strewn with flotsam and detritus, redolent with thousands of simultaneous different processes of animal and vegetable dismemberment and decay - all of this owes its existence to only one Author. And, naturally, it would be abhorred by the Beauty-worshiping Drehers of the world.

But why? The only Hand at work there is God's.

So if you want to celebrate Beauty as your aesthetic, sensate avatar of the Divine, sure, go right ahead, but realize, as the Drehers of the world will congenitally never be able to, that what you are celebrating is your view into a mirror, one you have previously constructed long ago to celebrate yourself and your achievements as a human being. Outside and beyond that mirror the purest realms of the solely Divine - the Bengali mud flat, the alien solar system dissolved in radioactive fury - look wholly different.

And meanwhile, the limbless, anacephalic stillborn child some thoughtless vandal dumps in the night on the steps of majestic, soaring Chartres, like so much garbage: whom does she inspire, and to what?

53 comments:

  1. Ah, now see, here's a topic I can roll up my sleeves and waste a lot of time thinking and writing about!

    Can I summarize your thesis as this: "Beauty is an artificial idea of man, not a quality of God's creation."?

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    1. Tom, Beauty may be a quality of God's creation, but, if so, who adjudicates which elements of reality share that quality and which get voted on or off the Beauty quality island - and why?

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  2. In my case, it was perfectly obvious from the beginning why one would want to be Orthodox.

    So it doesn't matter whether it is or isn't the fullness of the truth; it just matters that it's pretty, according to Dreher's notions of Pretty?

    This is more than merely narcissistic, although it certainly is that. It is profoundly relativistic, in the most post-Enlightenment-y way. If Dreher happened to visit a Jain temple that struck him by its beauty, would he then become a Jain? One wonders.

    Meanwhile, as you intimate, Keith, beauty is not an absolute. Aesthetic standards differ from person to person, from place to place, from era to era. I suppose there may be certain things that virtually everyone considers beautiful, but beyond that basic "core," it's a matter of "chacun a son gout."

    When the passion for the Picturesque swept Europe in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, aesthetes who held to the older classical ideal that had prevailed since the Renaissance were rather taken aback by the new aesthetic standards. As Elinor says to Marianne in Sense and Sensibility, “It is not everyone...who has your passion for dead leaves.”

    Yes, and not everyone has Dreher's passion for wall-to-wall icons and ornate gold vestments, either. To a large extent, beauty really is in the eye of the beholder. Some people feel most at home in a bright chandelier-lit Byzantine church adorned all over with eye-filling iconography. (Our local Greek Orthodox church matches this description, and I do find it very beautiful, although a tad too bright for my taste.) Other people are more attracted to an unadorned Cistercian interior or to an ornate Baroque church or to dimly lit neo-Gothic church with late-afternoon sunlight slanting through stained-glass windows. In my present hometown, founded by Moravians, there is an old Moravian church dating to the 18th century, with a severely bare interior -- just white plaster, dark wood, and high, austere windows. IMHO, it is one of the most beautiful churches I have ever been in. I do not have a Protestant bone in my body, but I do appreciate what I consider good architectural "bones." But then, that's just me, and I don't pretend that this little old Moravian church would be everyone's idea of a beautiful church.

    In short, there are certain common denominators, but there is also a LOT of variation in people's notions of what constitutes Beauty. Dreher seems to be oblivious to this. He extrapolates from his experiences and his sensibilities to everybody's.

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    1. Diane, you do know that the reason there are no published exterior photos of Rod's church is because it is simply a leased utility building out on Old Hwy 61 owned by a family friend, right?

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  3. And yeah, I know, Keats said Beauty is Truth and all that, but even his notions of beauty were somewhat conditioned by his time and place -- some of Romanticism's aesthetic ideals would have been unintelligible to artists and poets of previous eras. So, yeah, even if there's some Platonic Idea of Beauty, it seems to express itself in a gazillion different ways, not just Dreher's way. If that makes any sense.

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  4. OK, this reminds me of something from Facebook. A while ago I posted a YouTube of a performance of Josquin des Prez's "Ave Maria," with a comment that it was, for me, like the music of the angels. An Eastern Catholic chauvinist responded by posting some Byzantine chant and insisting that it was more sublime than Josquin's polyphony. I listened to it and concluded, "Meh." I mean, I liked and appreciated it and all, but it didn't stir my soul the way Josquin's piece did. Obviously it did stir this other guy's soul, and that's fine. To each his own!

    Some people are so control-freaky, though, that "to each his own" doesn't satisfy them. If they can't convert you to their aesthetics, then they conclude that you're just a boor or a philistine or whatever.

    Noooo, it just means that different things resonate with different people, and that's as it should be. Variety, spice of life, makes the world go 'round, etc. etc., right?

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    1. Diane, perhaps, unlike Rod, you like many others are only usually moved by beauty.

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  5. Dreher's entire self-congratulatory flatulence on this angle is so breathtakingly obtuse it's difficult to pick where to begin.

    A fetish for beauty doesn't lead to theosis, it simply maroons one in the universe as a simpleton aesthete, the numinous equivalent of being a Boob or other parts Man, or, more to the particular human example at hand, being stricken with a numinous Sensory Processing Disorder: warped, bent, and ultimately a slave to one's senses. To congratulate oneself on this condition is to beclown oneself authoritatively.

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    1. "A fetish for beauty doesn't lead to theosis...."

      Bingo. Some of the nastiest people I know are fastidious aesthetes.

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  6. Having just read this, I am wondering to what extent we can apply his insights to the architecture of Christian worship. Which forms are better at doing what worship is supposed to do?

    Shorter: How can we cobble together a rationale that gives us here peering down from the BenOp tree house a pretext of conceptual objectivity within which to determine that your faith and church are clearly inferior in God's eyes, as are you for bitterly clinging to them?

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    1. Lol!!

      But does Dreher really want to go there? I'd always heard that Gothic arches expressed more than any other architectural form man's striving and yearning toward Heaven. No reflection on onion domes, and with complete openness to instruction on this point...but what exactly do they express except onions?

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  7. Once again Drerod moves the beauty and truth of Orthodoxy into the lonely rooms of his banal self importance. We Orthodox want him gone..

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  8. I'll take issue a bit with Diane (and perhaps Keith) by asserting that Beauty is an objective good. We humans can recognize the beauty of nature as reflective of God the Creator, and can recognize those great works of art that express truth of human nature (i.e., in the image of God). Bach's music works throughout time and across cultures, as does Hamlet, the David, etc. I'll even toss in this quote from my old Physics book as an example:

    To anyone who is motivated by anything beyond the most narrowly practical, it is worthwhile to understand Maxwell's equations simply for the good of his soul.

    I agree with that.

    Having said that, there are of course matters of subjective taste, to be sure. We prefer some expressions to others -- I'd rather listen to some recordings of Mozart than others, and to Mozart instead of other equally accepted great and beautiful music -- just a matter of personal preference.

    Where Dreher goes wrong is of course his usual error of conflating matters of taste with matters of Truth. He asserts that "Matter matters", but then elevates his own personal tastes to the one way (see his recent posts on megachurches, contemporary Christian music, etc.), and wraps a "Benedict Option" label around those tastes. Just like he did with Crunchy Con, which is why it fell apart. In this particular post, Dreher hijacks the piece he quotes as support for his own self-serving jihad, along with making the errors that Keith and Diane point out above.

    I'd also add that time is a great filter. The generations since Chartres have helped to distinguish the beautiful from the mundane, while the music and buildings of the current day haven't been subjected to that sorting yet -- so it is easy pickings (and immune to verification) to diss contemporary expressions. E.g., I'll suggest that there are contemporary churches that will in fact hold up over time. Of course, not many may hold up over centuries but I can think of a few that will hold up for many decades at a minimum. This one does it for me, but of course that is just my personal taste.

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    1. Pik, I don't disagree, which is why I did say that there is some sort of basic core that everyone recognizes as beautiful. And yes, I agree that some artistic monuments transcend time. But beyond that...I do think it becomes a matter of taste, as you point out. You mentioned Mozart, and that's a great example. Most critics and scholars, I believe, would insist that his greatest opera is Don Giovanni, but Marriage of Figaro holds first place in my heart...no contest. Chacun a son gout.

      The David is another great example. Much as I love and appreciate the masterworks of the Italian Renaissance, they do not resonate with me as deeply as do some Early Netherlandish works like the van der Goes Adoration of the Shepherds.

      As usual, though, you have succinctly nailed the problem with Dreher's approach. He absolutizes his personal tastes and conflates them with eternal Truth.

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    2. You could take all other music away from me as long as you left me with Marriage of Figaro.

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    3. But of course, please don't take away all other music from me....

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    4. Today's treat for Diane (and everyone).

      The repeat beginning at 4:00 is heartbreaking.

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    5. Thank you, Pik! We are kindred spirits, it seems. :)

      Le Nozze has it all: humor, wit, pathos, romance, humanity, and reams of the most glorious music ever composed.

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    6. My freshman English teacher, 40 years ago in community college, told the class that at one time he didn't like opera at all. But then he said that one day he realized that opera has been around for all these many years, and that a lot of people loved it. So he figured that the problem wasn't with opera, but with himself -- so he gave it a try, started listening to it, and eventually fell in love with it. I've remembered that lesson all my life.

      And one day, many years later, I was driving around Houston on a shopping errand one Saturday and stumbled across the Texaco broadcast of some lesser Rossini opera. And thus started my interest. There's still a lot of opera I don't get or like, but I love the ones that I do.

      That little aside in a podunk college English class is one of the great educational gifts I've received. It's opened my eyes to now appreciate many many beautiful things, well beyond opera.

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    7. Ooooh, I can so relate! I hated opera when I was young. (Imagine, a half-Italian hating opera. Sad but true.)

      One day, many years ago, while I was studying, I had my radio on, listening to the local NPR station. I found that chamber music and stuff like that did not distract me while studying, and I needed something to relieve the boredom, so...NPR did the trick. But, as soon as opera started blaring, I would always turn the radio off, because opera was distracting.

      So, OK, on this occasion, opera did start blaring. I started to turn it off, but I couldn't. I was transfixed. It was Galina Vishnevskaya (sp?) singing the Letter Scene from Eugene Onegin. In one moment (just like you!) I fell in love with opera. And the rest. as they say, is history. :)

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  9. I also completely agree that time is the great filter and that some contemporary architecture will indeed stand the test of time.

    And of course my observations re Mozart and the Davjd were mostly pickiness. One may prefer Marriage of Figaro to Don Giovanni, but that does not vitiate your point that Mozart himself is universally recognized as sublimely great, across all eras unto the end of ages. ;)

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  10. I'll take issue a bit with Diane (and perhaps Keith) by asserting that Beauty is an objective good. We humans can recognize the beauty of nature as reflective of God the Creator...

    Pik, there are a couple things to address here if I am to link it back to the argument I initially made.

    First, let's agree that all of Nature is objectively beautiful to God, its awesome - in the original, truest sense of the word - Creator.

    Beyond that, though, I think Nature loses its objectivity and becomes beautiful to Man only insofar as it serves his subjective, anthropocentric prejudices. Certainly, few close to the consequences would describe the Nature that killed 12 in Dallas the other week beautiful, although it was unquestionably the same, objective Nature it always is. Further, if Nature were objectively beautiful to Man, the Rockies would have been as objectively beautiful to the Donner Party marooned in them as to the young lovers gazing at their profile against the sky.

    So, while there's no question that taste itself varies from human individual to human individual, I cannot see how Beauty itself cannot be anything other than a case of human-wide-and-species-centric taste, applied and withheld on the basis of other values that selectively steer and modify its own non-objectivity. We apply the standard "beauty" to Michelangelo's David and withhold it from the Hunchback of Notre Dame (a character constructed as an anti-beauty) because we value looking like the former over looking like the latter.

    My point, again, is that Beauty itself is a human value construct that we apply to things that please our humanness, God included - at least when we're not trying to make sense of theodicy - although neither God nor any part of his Creation is under any sort compulsion to be beautiful or anything else other than awesomely Godly, as and in whatever form He chooses.

    To reinforce any link between self-serving human values like Beauty and the Divine is precisely how the Dreher's of the world lay down the unjustified assumptive bases upon which they hope their subjective aesthetic riffs, particularly about themselves, come to be seen as logical, objective truth.

    You see, because I am unusually tuned to personal hygiene and am therefore unusually clean bodily (a quality the only usually clean folks can only hope to aspire to), I am therefore closer to God than the usual person, because as we all know by assuming so, God values exceptional bodily cleanliness over only average bodily cleanliness, and certainly over the smell of the warthog.

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    1. Keith, you and I might be thinking of beauty in different ways. This summarizes something I read long ago, and distinguishes beauty in the "enjoyable sense" from beauty in the "admirable sense". To wit:

      ...there is another aspect of beauty that most persons fail to consider. In addition to the enjoyable, there is the admirable. What makes one object more admirable tha[n] another is some excellence in the object itself. That which is more admirable may not also be more enjoyable.

      IOW, while the Donner party was not in much of a position to enjoy the beauty of the Rockies, the Rockies were as beautiful in the admirable sense to then as they are now to your lovers.

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    2. And to elaborate on your point:

      To reinforce any link between self-serving human values like Beauty and the Divine is precisely how the Dreher's of the world lay down the unjustified assumptive bases upon which they hope their subjective aesthetic riffs, particularly about themselves, come to be seen as logical, objective truth.

      I'd pose that Dreher conflates matters of beauty in the "enjoyable sense" with matters of beauty in the "admirable sense", in that whatever Dreher himself enjoys he considers to be objectively admirable, almost by definition.

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    3. Pik, I guess I see both "enjoyable" and "admirable" as interchangeably subjective.

      What I think of as objective are things like the acceleration of a body falling in Earth gravity at 32.2 ft/s/s as opposed to the subjective - and variable - perception "fast". That is, objective realities are what they are regardless of how I or anyone else decides to regard them.

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    4. I think this discussion is now officially over my head, LOL.

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  11. Beauty is Being considered as the cause of pleasure when it is apprehended. Since Beauty is Being, its existence is not subjective.

    What is subjective is our experience of beauty, the pleasure we experience when we apprehend something, and therefore our judgment of what is beautiful. But that our judgment of what is beautiful is subjective doesn't mean beauty is not an objective reality, any more than that our subjective judgment of what is good means goodness is not an objective reality.

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    1. If by "pleasure" you mean "pleasure rightly considered", then I think I'm with you on this. Although I may have just now joined Diane on this topic.....

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    3. Beauty is Being...

      I'm sorry, you're being tautological here, Tom, retroactively assuming your conclusion.

      You do it by retroactively establishing the value "Beauty" as ontologically "Being" after the fact of and because of the fact of someone having judged an aspect of "beingness" as beautiful (apprehended it with pleasure).

      This is similar to the implicit bait and switch I was criticizing Dreher for.

      Of course, if this happens to be an underpinning of your particular faith-world view, by all means carry on, but, strictly speaking logically, you're cheating.

      Of course, one can always claim that, created by God, all Being is Beautiful, but, again, as I stipulated at the outset in my conversation with Pik, that sort of concept of God naturally appreciating the whole of His Creation as good isn't really the conversation we're having here.

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    4. If by "pleasure" you mean "pleasure rightly considered", then I think I'm with you on this.

      Um... yeah, okay. At least, I certainly don't mean "pleasure not rightly considered."

      Although I can misapprehend something and be pleased by an apparent beauty, just as I can misjudge something and desire an apparent good -- or, I suppose, misreason and assert an apparent truth.

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    6. It's an empirical fact that there are things that we find pleasing to behold. If it happens to be an underpinning of your particular faith-world view that this is all subjective coincidence, Keith, by all means carry on, but strictly speaking your just making groundless assertions.

      Tom, now you're simply being sophistic (I never claimed coincidence, nor, by insinuation, randomness; I claimed anthropocentrism), not to mention petulant. It doesn't really matter whether your sophistry is only naive or intentional, it's demonstrably incorrect.

      In addition to long since having conflated beauty and pleasure (Is an orgasm beautiful? How about a finely grilled ribeye steak, not the sight, the taste; or the sensate passage of the firm, healthy turd it produces on exit?), now you want to claim that the mere objective existence of objects of our regard somehow invests them with empirical and objective versions of that transactional - not to mention equivocal - regard.

      Be my guest: explain how that works. We - but not all of us, and not all of the time, perceive some things, but not necessarily the same things, nor to the same degree, as beautiful, therefore beauty is an empirically objective aspect of reality - if, obviously, a coy and capricious one. Like a leprechaun.

      The fact that we, across cultures and across history, conditionally relate to some things in the world as "beautiful" doesn't establish "beauty" as an independent, empirically objective constituent of reality anymore than the fact that we universally find clouds of biting flies or other insects or other aspects of life as "irritating" invests "irritation" with an independent objective reality. To do so, you would be forced to demonstrate how beauty (or irritation) exists in the world independent of our perception of it in the same way that electromagnetic wavelength empirically underpins our perception of "blueness".

      That's what the words "empirical" and "objective" mean. Be my guest: make that demonstration of empirical objectivity.

      OTOH - instead of claiming coincidence - at the outset of this post I already supplied my argument for what underpins, surrounds and defines our perception and enjoyment of the human value "beauty", strictly considered: those regularities of existence which perpetuate human life and its prosperity.

      Predictability - as opposed to randomness, the handmaiden of imminent susceptibility to catastrophic disaster - which, in form, whether spatial or temporal, is expressed as regularity and symmetry. In human physical form, those aspects least indicative of genetic damage (future family and species disaster) from overt monstrosity to mere physical ugliness (generally, asymetry) or current apparent physical damage or apparent poor health (current family and species disaster).

      In sum, "beauty" is the value-avatar encapsulating our hopes and will to endure and prosper as humans. Shorter: "beauty" is ultimately nothing but our celebration of our own human chauvinism. We gaze upon Creation and declare which aspects of it are "beautiful" (and, implicitly, good) and which are not. That we want to then anneal such chauvinism to the Divine to invest it with ultimate authority is understandable. Whatever God thinks of this, He has the good manners not to say.

      But to mistakenly - naively or maliciciously - establish beauty as originally Divine, then retroactively arrogate the authority of that Divinity to use beauty as an intermediate tool with which to underwrite particular personal interests while deprecating others, all within the implicit aegis of Divinity, is pure Dreherism.


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    7. Keith, a couple of comments.

      First is that empirical proof is not a precondition for something being objectively true or good. There is much that is objectively true that cannot be empirically demonstrated or proven -- indeed, one could say that this has been proven (empirically, if you must). So to require empirical evidence that something is true is in appropriate. Quantum mechanics were true (as we understand it today) long before Einstein.

      And where I was going with the beauty-in-the-admirable-sense business is the incorporation of virtue into the analysis. There are things that are beautiful because the express something true and profound, whether it is God's love as expressed in the Creation, or in a work of art or other human action expressive of our true human nature or reflective of a truth.*

      Call it naive if strikes your fancy, but it is not Dreherism -- how insulting. Dreherism is the opposite error of concluding that something that he finds beautiful in the enjoyable sense is thus necessarily beautiful in the admirable sense, or worse yet concluding that something he does not find beautiful in the enjoyable sense (e.g., what Dreher has read about megachurches) is therefore by definition not beautiful in the admirable sense.

      *Conversely, one can enjoy pornography (indeed, take pleasure in it if you know what I mean), but I'd assert that it is not beautiful in the admirable sense because it is contrary to moral virtue (an objective good). (In this regard, Tom, I should have said "pleasure rightly ordered", rather than "rightly considered".) OTOH, if one believes that there is no objective moral virtue, or indeed no objective truths, then pleasure and enjoyment are all that matters and there is no beauty in the admirable sense.

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    8. First is that empirical proof is not a precondition for something being objectively true or good. There is much that is objectively true that cannot be empirically demonstrated or proven -- indeed, one could say that this has been proven (empirically, if you must). So to require empirical evidence that something is true is in appropriate. Quantum mechanics were true (as we understand it today) long before Einstein.

      But I never claimed the two were synonymous, Pik. I was responding to Tom's usages. Both designations, however, require existence independent of a volitional human subjectivity.

      Second, naive is the opposite of intentional. It doesn't exclusively mean clueless.

      Your Adlerian categories naturally remain your prerogative, but they seem to me to trap you in reductionistic simplicities more than aid you in explaining experience. For another thing, they seem to have disabled your ability to understand my final paragraph as written.

      I find beauty most elegantly and comprehensively understandable as an aspirational human value: we value beauty as the representation of a human condition less dangerous, more prosperous, more self-human-affirming (particularly with respect to our own virtuousness), less cumbersome (easier), i.e., more elegant in solution and execution, less mortal, etc.

      Beauty is the representative aspirational self-improvement template of the human will and a phenomenon long predating both Judaism and Christianity.

      That we would add Christianity to those aspirations once it appeared is only natural, but not at all the same thing I diagrammed in my final paragraph. We humans created the notion of beauty and continue to use it and misuse it to our own ends, particularly with respect to how we incorporate the Divine into the mix.

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    9. I understand your last paragraph of that comment, Keith -- I just disagree with the premise that it is a mistake to establish beauty as an objective good (divine, if you insist). But that premise isn't necessary to the rest of your paragraph, which I accept as Dreherism.

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    10. Pik, I don't know if it's a mistake to establish beauty as an objective reality or not. Many of the things we do as humans involve externally objectifying subjectivities. I was simply arguing against the validity of using beauty as a catalyst in the process attempting to externally objectify and deify one's parochial preferences.

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  12. Sorry, my last comment was unnecessarily snippy, in an attempt to score a quick point and go to bed.

    It is an empirical fact that humans experience pleasure in the intellectual apprehension of different things. But why do humans have this experience? What causes it?

    We might say the cause lies entirely within the human who is pleased, that what we call "beauty" is only and entirely "a human value construct that we apply to things that please our humanness." But this would mean the fact of broad but not universal agreement on what is beautiful is just a coincidence. If there's nothing inherently pleasing in, say, Michelangelo's Pieta, or a baby's laughter, then why are so many people pleased by these things?

    To say, "Beauty is Being considered as the cause of pleasure when it is apprehended," is to say there is something inherently pleasing in these things, to say that there is something outside of ourselves that is a cause of our pleasure at apprehending things we call beautiful. Since it's our intellects that must do the apprehending, the cause of the pleasure by which we identify the beautiful is a combination of external and internal, or objective and subjective. The subjective aspect involved in our determining whether a thing is beautiful suffices to explain why there isn't universal agreement.

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    1. Tom, I was posting while you were.

      My explanation of what unites - though not investing them with inherency - things in a commonality we refer to as "beauty" is in my comment, above.

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    2. Right, you agree that what we find beautiful lies, objectively, in the things themselves that we find beautiful, but you stop short of "investing them with inherency."

      The problem is, inherency simply means that one thing lies, objectively, in another. Those certain regularities of existence do, empirically, inhere in the things we rightly call beautiful; we do not adhere, by an act of thought, those regularities to the things.

      So you've actually already granted the objective existence of beauty, you just don't call it "beauty" because (and do correct my paraphrase) you see it as an unsubstantiated equivocation to use the same word to describe a thing and our human experience of that thing, the more so since the equivocation implies, I think you'd say, that the way humans experience a thing is somehow bound up in what the thing is in itself.

      If I may risk an analogy, you see it as sort of like agreeing that there are stars visible in the night sky, but disagreeing that there are constellations in the sky, in any sense other than that human imagination groups certain sets of stars in certain ways.

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    3. Right, you agree that what we find beautiful lies, objectively, in the things themselves that we find beautiful, but you stop short of "investing them with inherency."

      Tom, in my own words, I'd say we assemble Beauty from specific elements of our external environment - because, of course, in our practical trafficking in the matter among ourselves, artistically, linguistically and otherwise, we deal with it as a perceived externality, unlike, say, "jealosy" - in order to create the, again, external, and, further, public, representation of the collective value Beauty we aspire to as a species.

      Thus, we include the Miss America with two legs symmetrically the same length, but not the lady with the 12" discrepancy between them better suited for circumnavigating hills. We typically refer to babies as beautiful regardless of appearance and not merely out of politeness, because of the hopes we invest in them, but very rarely do we refer to a body farm as beautiful, although the occasional forensic biologist might very well choose "beauty" to describe his appreciation of the orderly processes of decay and dissolution involved. We refer to entire natural experiences that sustain and validate us as beautiful, but rarely if ever to those which do the opposite. As an aside to Pik here, I'd add that alternate value-expressions such as "majestic" or "admirable" are just that, alternate value-expressions, not synonyms for "beauty".

      So, again, my main point is that "beauty" per se, unlike, say, copper ore or even geometric form, doesn't actually exist in the external world, either philosophically or empirically, but is rather, again, an aspirational value born solely of anthropocentric chauvinism, even vanity.

      Thus, to reiterate the initial point of my post again, namely, that when someone like a Rod Dreher attempts to insinuate that Beauty is somehow originally and fundamentally a principle of the Divine in order to retroactively reverse engineer and boost the status of his own tastes, particularly over and against those of others, he deserves mocking for his thoughtless mendaciousness. God is no more compelled to sort His Creation according to human ideas of beauty than He is to do so to the tastes of this month's Kardashian.

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    4. As an aside to Pik here, I'd add that alternate value-expressions such as "majestic" or "admirable" are just that, alternate value-expressions, not synonyms for "beauty".

      In the sense I used them, "admirable" is distinct from "enjoyable" in that beauty in the "admirable" sense calls on objective goods (truth, moral virtues, etc.) while "enjoyable" does not. So those two words were not used as synonyms, but to express different qualities, specifically objective vs. subjective.

      I'm not sure you've addressed that point, other than dismissing both senses as human constructs. As I see it, "admirable" is not a subjective human construct.

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    5. In the sense I used them, "admirable" is distinct from "enjoyable" in that beauty in the "admirable" sense calls on objective goods (truth, moral virtues, etc.) while "enjoyable" does not. So those two words were not used as synonyms, but to express different qualities, specifically objective vs. subjective.

      Very well, then, in a previous example you claimed the beauty of the Rockies was in an admirable sense, whatever the objective limits of an admirable sense turn out to be.

      What objective goods - truth, moral virtues, etc. - do the Rockies possess, objectively or subjectively, which render them objects of admirable beauty rather than enjoyable beauty?

      If you want to claim there are objective schema at play here, Pik, you're going to have to explain how they function and, if they don't, how and why they fail. For example if individual A admires object C but individual B does not, what went wrong? Which one is incorrect or at fault, and why?

      As a postscript, is it possible to modify or add to Adler's two categories of beauty, or do we have to somehow fit beauty across the entire range through which we experience it on all occasions into either one or the other?

      Or do these problems just not come up much?

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    6. So, again, my main point is that "beauty" per se, unlike, say, copper ore or even geometric form, doesn't actually exist in the external world, either philosophically or empirically, but is rather, again, an aspirational value born solely of anthropocentric chauvinism, even vanity.

      Right, and again, my point is you're wrong. Beauty is not a human construct artificially imposed on external things, it's a fact of existence that the human intellect is able to apprehend.

      The human intellect is a dodgy thing, and don't even get me started on the human will, so it's no surprise that people misuse, in all sorts of ways, the human capacity to apprehend beauty. Nor is this misuse evidence for your position; people do bad things all the time, and we don't say goodness is an imposition of human imagination on reality.

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    7. What Tom said.

      First off, Keith, I don't see the Adler categories as either/or. There are things that are both admirable and enjoyable (Beethoven's 9th). But as previously mentioned, there are things that are enjoyable but not admirable (I used the porn example above), and things that are admirable but perhaps not widely enjoyable (the innate human dignity of your hunchback is beautiful in the admirable sense). See 1 Peter 3:3-4 for a scriptural reference as to the distinction, too.

      To me, a natural wonder (the Tetons, perhaps) that different peoples over the centuries have independently viewed as beautiful would seem to have some innate objective quality that calls to all of us -- both admirable and enjoyable. The natural wonder of solid water being less dense than liquid water seems an admirable non-man-made beauty, as that gift from the Creator enables marine life (and perhaps all life as we know it) -- which we humans apprehend but that isn't enjoyable in the conventional sense. The example I gave above of Maxwell's equations also fits in this category (while they may not enjoyable to the beginning electrical engineering student).

      I'm sure this is inadequate as "proof" of the idea, but I hope the examples at least show what I'm talking about.

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    8. So, according to the two of you, beauty is an external quality commonly innate within things as diverse as a perfectly formed female breast (in the admirable sense, to another heterosexual woman), enough so to be immortalized for man and woman alike in paint or marble, but not within the same woman's anus, regardless of form; in a sunny summer's day but not in a hemorrhagic bleed-out from EBOV; in Chartres cathedral; in thousands and thousands of other different instances but distinctly not in hundreds of thousands of different others, thus eliminating it as a fundamental, common constituent of either Divine Creation or human artifice; but neither of you can rationally explain that unique commonality across profoundly radically different manifestations of the human experience of reality, nor how the process works, nor why. Your best argument is simply that I'm wrong, because.

      From the Adlerian perspective specifically, beauty (whatever it is, which somehow just exists, unquestioned) must be assigned to either the admirable sense, the enjoyable sense, or some subjectively variable combination of the two, which essentially ends up putting the cart before the horse: the actual trans-human experience of beauty effectively ends up now doing the rendering of any meaning possibly remaining in the now-tortured uses of the terms "admirable" and "enjoyable"; they no longer possess any original nor dependable meaning but must now mean whatever any one needs them to mean to describe an infinity of possible phenomena. Differently put, the rational conceptual vocablary of beauty is now imprisoned within only four qualifying descriptors, admirable, enjoyable, admirable-enjoyable, and enjoyable-amirable, which is like trying to explain large portions of reality while being imprisoned within a language with only four words. Just because Adler's a philosophical populist in Wikipedia doesn't render his conceptuology any more functional, any more than the BO should be accepted unquestioned merely because someone elected Dreher a "conservative intellectual".

      Still, that's fine. As I mentioned to Tom, if one's understanding of beauty is a function of one's Catholic faith and and Catholic-determined world view, that's all one needs to say. Tom, you're correct: because I'm not Catholic, therefore I am wrong from your perspective. That's perfectly fine, I happily accept that.

      But if you expect to take on sophistic hustlers, particulaly those like Dreher who aggressively assault your Church itself, on their own ground, on their own terms, and not just retreat into the consolation of yours, you're going to need a bigger and better conceptual toolbox and armamentarium than you've so far displayed here.

      For now, why don't we just leave this argument here (of course feel free to take a final word; I'm not trying to shut anyone up) before Pauli finally snaps and starts posting Muppet videos.

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    9. Thanks for the advice, Keith. I haven't been trying to display my biggest and best conceptual toolbox and armamentarium here. I've mostly been trying to explain the meaning of the proposition that the beauty we apprehend exists in the things we call beautiful, as opposed to in ourselves, and to understand your own opinion.

      The argument, "because I'm not Catholic, therefore I am wrong from your perspective," is your own invention. I never asserted or implied anything like that; it's an invalid argument, logically speaking, and there are plenty of examples of non-Catholics who accept beauty as a transcendental property of being -- and, no doubt, plenty of Catholics who don't.

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    10. Tom, you haven't explained anything other that what you believe about beauty. Maybe you don't know what a logical-rational explanation entails: it begins with how/why something even is (Yo! Why's there even something we call beauty?) and then attempts to work out what's missing from that beginning (here's how it seems to operate, why does it do that? Here's why beauty is (God included), how does it fully manifest itself?) You've only told me that I'm wrong, presumably for not passively agreeing with you.

      In the absence of any rational explanation of how beauty variably and inconstantly, that is, absolutely not uniformly inheres like some sort of fickle phlogiston across not only a human experience so varied that it includes, boobs, babies' smiles, operas, abstract geometric form, Chartes, and a thousand other disparate things but also the entire undefined dimension of "being" itself (a rather large bite of Red Man, for anyone), I merely advanced the offer that I'd be more than happy to accept "because my Catholic faith tells me so" as an alternative to a rational argument.

      You can believe what you believe about beauty because it's the Catholic stance you take, and that's fine with me if that's your reason. You can believe what you believe about beauty because someone said something that impressed you authoritatively, it felt right to you, and you never bothered to question it, and that's fine with me if that's your reason. I'm not trying to belittle anyone for their faith-based beliefs, religious or merely psychological.

      But if you want to tell me I'm rationally wrong about an explanation that addresses the immediate problems that beauty presents (not empirical, trans-human, variable and inconstant across wildly disparate aspects of human existence, variable and inconstant within even individual human experience across time, etc.), you're going to have to play by the same common rules of rational discourse that bind me and everyone else. You can't take faith-based cover for faulty or non-existent rational argument.

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    11. Keith, if you had stopped after your first sentence, I might have replied to it. That you went on for another four tl:dr paragraphs is Nature's way of telling me to find something better to do.

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    12. It's pretty apparent that we're not going to solve this issue here -- it's a long-standing issue that more educated philosophers than I still argue about. But a couple of ancillary points ought to be made:

      It is error to conclude that one believes beauty is objective because one is Catholic (or the converse). Take it from this convert, discussion of beauty in the objective/subjective senses was not part of the instruction - there were more important topics to be covered.

      Having said that, I continue to be amazed and overjoyed that the more I learn about the Catholic faith, the more I see and learn that it reflects our true God-given human nature.

      And second, regarding this statement:

      But if you expect to take on sophistic hustlers, particulaly those like Dreher who aggressively assault your Church itself, on their own ground, on their own terms, and not just retreat into the consolation of yours, you're going to need a bigger and better conceptual toolbox and armamentarium than you've so far displayed here.

      Assuming you believe I lack the proper "armamentarium", I can only respond with: "Oh, please". I've been doing that for years around here, particularly on his conflating of matters of taste with matters of truth. Belief in beauty being only subjective is not necessar to do (and it certainly wouldn't be sufficient). I explained this above and am not going to repeat it.

      Over and out (on this issue).

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    13. Yes, I agree this has become a dead end. With respect to Tom, I assumed he would prove to be what the first commenter to this post eagerly promised, but I will accept any role I may have played in emotionally derailing that initial promise somewhere along the way.

      I've mentioned Catholicism only because of the role traditionally played by Scholasticism and scholastic philosophy in Catholic teachings, so as repeatedly mentioned out of courtesy I was prepared to accept without challenge thinking explicitly from a Catholic world view. But, while their have been repeated denials of any influence of Catholicism, there have also been no other arguments than dogmatic scholastic ones. If there have been, show me.

      Obviously this is the wrong sort of post and argumentation to put up in EQE. My bad, and I promise not to repeat my mistake.

      Over and out (on this issue) as well.

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  13. My last paragraph on Dreherism, above, acted out by two sword-wielding armadillos sporting handlebar mustaches:

    "I built this nice hut. It's beautiful.

    "Beautiful hut."

    "No, you don't understand, I really meant to say it was inspired by God, not me, therefore the beautiful hut I built is more beautiful than the identical beautiful hut you built."

    "But what if my identical beautiful hut were also inspired by God?"

    "Not possible. Mine is more beautiful, because it was inspired by God. Therefore, yours couldn't have been inspired by God, because it's less beautiful."

    "Oh."

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